Adopting a profit-based approach to the estimation of the technical efficiency of South Korean banks over the 2007Q3 to 2011Q2 period, we systematically analyse, within a nonparametric DEA analysis, how the choice of risk management control variable impacts upon such estimates. Using the model of Liu et al. (2010), we examine the dependency of the estimated technical efficiency scores on the chosen risk control variables embracing loan loss provisions and equity as good inputs and non-performing loans as a bad output. We duly find that, both for individual banks and banking groups, the mean estimates are indeed model dependent although, for the former, rank correlations do not change much at the extremes. Based on the application of the Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) adapted Li (1996) test, we then find that, if only one of the three risk control variables is to be included in such an analysis, then it should be loan loss provisions. We also show, however, that the inclusion of all three risk control variable is to be preferred to just including one, but that the inclusion of two such variables is about as good as including all three. We therefore conclude that the optimal approach is to include (any) two of the three risk control variables identified. The wider implication for research into bank efficiency is that the optimal choice of risk management control variable is likely to be crucial to both the delivery of un-biased estimates of bank efficiency and the specification of the model to be estimated.
Introduction
The dependency on bank efficiency estimates within a data envelopment analysis (DEA) on the specification of the input/output relationship is well known (see for example, Drake et al. (2009) for analysis of the issue within a Japanese context). Moreover, there is wide awareness within the research community -see below at section 2 -of the need to incorporate risk management control variables within such models if unbiased efficiency estimates are to be produced. However, little empirical research has been undertaken to examine the sensitivity of such estimates to the choice of risk control variable 1 . Accordingly, this study, as far as we are aware, represents the first to systematically address this issue, within a Korean context, using a recently released rich data set covering the development of the South Korean banking industry during the period 2007Q3 to 2011Q2. This period, of course traverses the pre, actual and post -Global Financial Crisis (GFC) eras, thus allowing for interesting inter-temporal comparisons.
In terms of the input/output specification, we have opted for the 'profit-based' approach, pioneered by Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Mester (1997 and 2003) , in preference to the so-called 'production' and 'intermediation' approaches developed by Benston and Smith (1976) and Sealey and Lindley (1977) respectively. Arguably, this is the most relevant approach for banking systems that are open, highly-developed and competitive, as in South Korea (see Hall and Simper (2013) ; Doh (2012) ; and Ree et al. (2012) ). Moreover, as argued by Berger and Mester (1997) , the profit-based approach is superior to both the intermediation and production approaches because it takes account of inefficiencies on both the input and output fronts.
The need to include risk control variables within an analysis of Korean bank efficiency was highlighted by Korea's experience with the GFC. Given the Korean banks' dependence on overseas markets for the funding of domestic loans 2 and the deterioration in asset quality 3 , management control of interest rate, exchange rate and liquidity risks was at a premium alongside credit risk management.
As for the selection of risk management control variables to be included in the analysis, the standard variables available from the banks' published reports and accounts embrace: 'Loan Loss Provisions' (LLP) 4 , which directly affect profits through the banks' income statement; 'Equity', which is accumulated on the liabilities side of the balance sheet and directly affects the cost of banks' risk-taking; and, finally, 'Non-performing Loans' (NPL), for which accounting definitions differ across financial systems worldwide 5 . Like most other authors -see section 2 -we focus on these three variables in our analysis, but use a relatively-new non-parametric model proposed by Liu et al. (2010) that allows for the inclusion of both 'desirable' inputs (i.e., LLP and Equity) and 'undesirable' outputs (i.e., NPL) within a profit-based approach to efficiency estimation. Finally, using the Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) adapted Li (1996) test, we are able to determine which variables to exclude/include in our systematic modelling strategy and whether the different models, reflecting the different input/output specifications, produce significant differences in Xefficiency distributions.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we briefly discuss the background to the inclusion of risk management control variables in bank efficiency studies. Section 3 describes our non-parametric modelling methodology which allows all and sub-sets of the risk management control variables to be included in efficiency estimation and also how we distinguish between the different estimated modelling distributions. Section 4 presents the results of our analysis of South Korean banking profit efficiency, looking at how scores change (if at all) under the different postulated specifications. Finally, in section 5 we summarise and conclude.
Risk management control variables used in the bank efficiency empirical literature
Taking each of the three risk management variables commonly used in the literature in turn, the use of Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) as a risk control variable can lead to problematic 4 "The amount of losses which have been specifically identified is recognized as an expense and deducted from the carrying amount of the appropriate category of loans and advances as a provision for losses on loans and advances. The amount of potential losses not specifically identified but which experience indicates are present in the portfolio of loans and advances is also recognized as an expense and deducted from the total carrying amount of loans and advances as a provision for losses on loans and advances" (International Accounting Standard IAS 30). 5 An NPL under Basel II (Basel Committee, 2004) is any loan that is past due for more than 90 days, but it is subject to wide national variation. If we consider how many days a bank has to allow for a 100% consumer loan write-down as a non-performing loan in South America, it is 366 days in Argentina, 180 in Chile, 90 in Columbia, 120 in Ecuador, 126 in Mexico and 120 in Peru (for more details see Galindo and Rojas-Suarez (2011) . In relation to efficiency studies that utilise LLP as a risk control variable, these 6 Proposals for counter-cyclical provisioning under Basel III are designed to address this issue (Basel Committee, 2010) . 7 Some studies have used LLP in cross country estimations, including Delis and Papanikolaou (2009) , whose sample was acceded European countries and 9 West European countries. Hensel (2003) , another to conduct a cross-country study, divided LLP by total assets and argued that "loan loss provisions are included as a measure of the cost to a bank in making loans. When the loan is defaulted upon, the loan loss provision appears in the financial statements. The loan loss provision constitutes funds which could be used elsewhere if a bank did not make loans, and hence represents the opportunity cost of making loans" (page 341).
include: as a bad input, Drake et al. (2006) , Shen and Chen (2010) , Paradi et al. (2011) and Hadad et al. (2011) ; and as a bad output, Park and Weber (2006) 8 and Fukuyama and Weber (2009) .
With respect to equity, Mester (1997 and 2003) , Fan and Shaffer (2004) , Park and Weber (2006) , Akhigbe and Stevenson (2010) , Han et al. (2012) and Wheelock and Wilson (2012) all include this as an input to account for a bank's solvency, which is routinely subject to regulatory scrutiny and control 9 . The equity to total assets ratio has also been widely used in European cross country bank studies, including those by Bos and Schmiedel (2007) and Kosak and Zoric (2011) , and, in a study concerning central and Eastern European banks, by Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. (2009) As such, Berger and Mester (2003) treat it as an environmental variable calculated as the "market-average of nonperforming loans (past due at least 90 days or on a non-accrual basis) divided by total loans" -hence being common across all banks
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. Studies that endogenise 8 They subtract LLP from the good output 'total loans'. 9 One of the first bank efficiency studies to include equity as a risk variable was that of Hughes and Mester (1993) , who argued that, "recognizing that financial capital is an input but omitting it in the cost function is equivalent to assuming that the unit price of financial capital is perfectly correlated with one of the other input prices or is the same for all banks (and so its price need not be included separately in the cost function), and that the level of financial capital is determined endogenously as that level which minimizes cost. If we believed that the bank were operating with the cost-minimizing level of financial capital but that the price of financial capital and price of deposits differed, we would include the unit price of financial capital in the cost function. However, there is good reason to suspect that the level of financial capital a bank holds may not be explained entirely by cost minimization. First, regulators set a minimum capital-asset ratio for banks and this may constrain banks from operating at the cost-minimizing financial capital level. Second, if the bank exhibits some risk aversion, then, because lower capital implies higher probability of default (capital acts as a cushion for losses), banks may choose a noncost-minimizing level of financial capital" (page 295-6). 10 One of the first bank efficiency studies to include non-performing loans was Mester (1996) who argued that "while the macroeconomy can affect nonperforming loans, it is felt equally across banks. It is the differences in nonperforming loans across banks that capture differences in quality across banks" (page 1035). The inclusion of nonperforming loans was therefore included, along with equity, in a stochastic cost frontier model to account for bank risk.
NPL in the production programme include Akhigbe and Stevenson (2010) , who argue that it is a measure of the current operating environment and "accounts for negative (and positive) external shocks to the Bank Holding Company's (BHC's) operating environment not under the control of the BHC's management" (page 135). While Fan and Shaffer (2004) note that NPL are "included as a measure of credit risk, which could reflect a combination of exogenous environmental (market) characteristics, variations in the quality of banks' management and shirking, and strategic decisions to accept and price differing levels of credit risk" (page 6). In contrast, Thoraneenitiyan and Avkiran (2009) and Delis et al. (2011) transformed the output variable 'total loans' by subtracting the value of non-performing loans "in order to compare banks on the same level playing field in terms of loan quality" (page We next present our methodology and summary data variables.
3 Modelling methodology and data
DEA models with undesirable inputs and outputs
To facilitate our analysis of the technology of South Korean banking, let x and y represent vectors of inputs and outputs, respectively, pertinent to production technology of banking services in South Korea and assume that this technology can be characterised by the technology or Production Possibility Set (P),
This set is unobserved to a researcher but can be estimated using the actual data on inputs and outputs via Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which is a non-parametric method to identify the 'best-practice' frontier rather than the central-tendency. The DEA can directly use input/output data to evaluate the relative efficiencies of decision-making units (DMUs) using piecewise linear approximation of the frontier of technology set (1) presumed to have generated the data. The DMUs that appear on the estimated DEA frontier are classified as efficient units. Since its introduction by Charnes et al. (1978) , the Charnes, Cooper and
Rhodes (CCR) model has become a popular tool of performance evaluation in many areas, and research on performance in banking in particular, and we follow this paradigm.
Recently, many researchers have proposed different types of DEA models to deal with undesirable inputs and/or outputs when evaluating the performance of DMUs with such characteristics. The existing models can be broadly categorized into two types. One type applies transformations, such as the so-called 'ADD' approach, proposed by (Koopmans (1951) ), the linear transformation (adopted by Ali and Seiford (1990) , Pastor (1996 ), Scheel (2001 , and Seiford and Zhu (2002)), and the 'multiplicative inverse' (adopted by Golan and Roll (1989) and Lovell et al. (1995) ).
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The other type uses a type of assumption on disposability, such as 'Weak Disposability' (see Färe and Grosskopf (2004) ) and 'Extended Strong Disposability' in the case of undesirable inputs and outputs (see Liu et al. (2010) ).
In terms of theory, loans that were made some time ago but thought to be defaulted on, but now are being repaid (due to positive external factors affecting the borrower, such as obtaining employment after a spell of unemployment), are a desirable output; whereas, for a borrower who is still in default, the loan is an undesirable output -leading to negative and positive changes in LLP respectively. This is deemed 'free disposability', as reducing LLP frees up funds to create more outputs (loans). In the case of Extended Strong Disposability, again using loans as an output, Equity can be linked to loan losses and also good risk management. That is, loans can be increased if the bank holds sufficient equity to absorb the potential extra loan losses. The latter situation is different to that discussed in Färe et al. 12 See Liu and Sharp (1999) for further discussions.
(1989), where they assume that strong disposability is not possible with respect to bad outputs (in the general case, studies in the literature concern energy generation with the bad output being pollution) -implying they cannot be freely disposed of. In our example, as the bank has already provisioned for the bad output (loans) in a previous period, it has no effect on the current balance sheet of the bank involved in the disposal of the bad loan.
However, it should also be noted that, even though Extended Strong Disposability is assumed to be bounded in non-banking industries, this might not be true in the banking world! That is, if bounded, this implies that loan losses are limited to equity reserves, when the bank subsequently enters bankruptcy. But, with respect to South Korean banks, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) saw the government create the Bank Recapitalisation Fund with KRW20 trillion (US$13.5 billion) of funding, 4KRW trillion of which was used to buy subordinated and hybrid securities from 8 banks. Given the increasing NPL from household loans and loans to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in 2009/10, the government also guaranteed all SME loans made by banks through the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund, meaning that no bank failed. Indeed, guarantee schemes were common across many countries as they stabilised banking systems to ensure that that the 'too-big-to-fail' banks were still operational. For example, in the US, $250 billion of the $700 billion TARP funds was used to recapitalise the US banking system, with Citigroup and Bank of America subsequently receiving additional TARP funding. Assuming, however, 'possible' bounded limits on the undesirable inputs and outputs, the estimated technology set can be written as follows:
where
D U j j j y y y = are desirable and undesirable inputs and outputs of the jth DMU, respectively; see Liu et al. (2010) .
By assuming Extended Strong Disposability, we can regard the undesirable inputs as desirable outputs, and/or the undesirable outputs as desirable inputs, and then use the standard Strong Disposability assumption (Liu et al. (2010) 
By adding the convexity constraint
, we can obtain the BCC-type Technical Efficiency (TE) scores and, hence, the Overall Efficiency (OE) scores (see note 17 below).
Adapted Li test for analysing the different models
There are different ways of making formal comparisons or tests between results from different models. The simplest, perhaps, is the comparison of the means (i.e., first moments of distributions) and another simple and popular approach is the comparison of variances (i.e., second moments). The approach we take here as the main tool is to compare the distributions of efficiency scores from different models by estimating the corresponding densities and testing their equalities. For this purpose we use the testing ideas of Li (1996 Li ( , 1999 , based on kernel-density estimators and bootstrap, and in particular, its adaptation to DEA context from Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) . Note that this test is often used to test the equality of distributions from different samples, but it is general enough to test the equality of distributions of a variable from the same sample that passed through different estimators.
The idea of such an application is similar in the spirit to many statistical tests, where different estimators are used for estimating the same target in different ways and the question is whether the difference they yield for a particular sample is due to the estimation noise or is systematic.
To be precise, let In our analysis we wish to examine if any of the eight different model variations discussed below result in significantly differing distributions. We will adopt Algorithm II from Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) where any DMU that scores one and hence is deemed to be on the frontier has its score 'smoothed' away from the frontier by the addition of small noise.
That is, more formally, when we have desirable and undesirable inputs and outputs, 
where the smoothing parameter, j ε is selected as described in Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) .
The next section presents our preferred banking model and the different risk variables and model permutations estimated to analyse whether the use of different risk control variables makes a significant difference to the results.
Data choice and banking model motivation
With the profit-based approach in mind, we specify eight different models (each using 272 bank observations) -see Table 1 -which use a combination of traditional inputs/outputs, potentially including up to two 'good inputs' and one 'bad output'. Our choice of inputs The disruptions happened in three ways: by directly reducing the availability of offshore credit to Asia-Pacific residents; by increasing demand from non-residents to borrow in AsiaPacific markets; and by leading market-makers to scale back their activities" (page. 10). That is, before the GFC, the loan-to-deposit ratio was particularly high, as domestic lenders sought out investments that offered higher returns than the domestic banks. The domestic banks therefore relied on non-deposit funding, which saw increases pre-GFC from 103% (in Table 1.   INSERT TABLE 1 Following Drake et al. (2009) , on the output side we allow South Korean banks to gain profits from the 'net interest revenue' on intermediated funds, 'fee and trading income' and, finally, from 'other operating revenues', the last-mentioned relating to the increasing importance of off-balance-sheet trading in Korean banking. Finally, as part of our addition to the literature concerning the nature of risk management in banking and how this should be 14 Denotes capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management skill (M), earnings (E) and liquidity (L). 15 The need to include 'fee and trading income' was also noted by Doh (2012 
Results

Analysis of the technical efficiency scores of the South Korean banking industry.
The mean radial Technical Efficiency estimates for all banks and groups across the sample period 2007Q3 to 2011Q2 are presented in Table 2 . Given that these scores are averaged before, during and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), they offer a simple, yet informative narrative on which banks and groups performed relatively-well compared to their competitors and also whether there were any dramatic changes in ranks or scores across the eight models. As can be seen from Figures 1 to 3 present results for the different banking sectors but, instead of averaging over time, we average across each bank within the models. This allows us to determine if there are any differences across models and also how the efficiency scores change before, during and after the GFC. Firstly, there are no appreciable differences across the models in any bank sector, with all within at least a 5% standard deviation of the scores.
In terms of the Commercial and Regional Banks, Models 1 and 8 give the highest and Models 6 and 7 the lowest scores; yet, for Specialist banks, Models 3 and 6 give the highest and 
Analysis of the technical efficiency scores of individual South Korean banks
To provide an initial insight into our results we first consider the individual Technical Figure 18 , there was a quite dramatic collapse in the bank's score, in all models, to between 0.11 to 0.13. In the following year it jumped back to respectable levels, 16 Indeed, those banks that sold hybrid and subordinated debt to the bank recapitalisation fund included the commercial banks Woori (KRW1,000 bn), Kookmin (KRW1,000 bn), Hana (KRW 400 bn) and the specialist National Federation of Fisheries (or Suhyup) (KRW100 bn), and the regional banks Kyoungnam (KRW116 bn) and Kwangju (KRW 87 bn). As at end of March 2011, only the commercial banks Woori (KRW300 bn), Kookmin (KRW400 bn) and Hana (KRW100 bn) redeemed the debt from the government as their balance sheets improved post-GFC. Banks which exhibited Technical Efficiency stability around the 3 rd quartile (i.e., with average scores from 0.5 to 0.75) across all models only included the Regional Banks i.e., Daegu Bank, Jeonbuk Bank, Kwangju Bank and Pusan Bank. The banks that steadily improved their efficiency scores over the same period comprise Hana Bank (see Figure 5) , the Industrial Bank of Korea (see Figure 17 ) and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (or Nonghyup) (see Figure 19) . Contrariwise, the bank that stood out as facing a consistent reduction in its scores was the Regional Bank Kyoungnam Bank, with average scores falling from 0.76 to 0.52 over the sample period. Finally, the banks that were consistently the poorest performers comprised the Regional Bank Jeonbuk Bank (+/-0.15 from 0.55 in all quarters for all models except for a one off jump to around 0.9 in 2010Q3 -see Figure 13 ) and the Specialist Bank the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives, whose scores averaged around the 0.5 mark except for a one off jump to the frontier in 2009Q4 (see Figure 20) 17 .
Testing significance of the differences between the models
In this section we discuss whether the estimated efficiency scores from the 8 model specifications have significantly different distributional equality. The Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) adapted Li (1996) test results shown in Table 3 indicate that, out of the possible permutations, there are 12 significant differences across the models. Beginning with the base specification, where all risk control variables are excluded (Model 7), we can determine that there is no difference in efficiency scores from models including only NPLs (Model 2) or EQ as including all 3. To recap, if 3 is better than 1 (which is better than 0), and 3 is the same as 2, then including 2 risk variables is better than including 1. To finalise, we propose that when modelling South Korean banks a combination of 2 variables from Equity, Loan Loss
Provisions and Non-performing Loans be included; it is not necessary for the inclusion of all three, overcoming the problem of the 'curse of dimensionality'.
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At the theoretical level, a specification that includes all three risk management control variables could lead to a cancelling effect of one variable over another, hence giving the result that the inclusion of the three risk variables is no different from the inclusion of two risk variables. For example, when declaring an increase in NPL, a bank increases its LLP (on the profit and loss account), which then feeds through to Equity capital. This affects the retained earnings and profitability of the bank and hence reduces, next quarter -if, for example, operating under a pro-cyclical LLP strategy -the availability of funds to make loans. Once this happens, the 'net interest revenue' (a good output) decreases. By definition, efficiency also decreases, as good outputs decrease relative to the increase in good inputs (including LLP and Equity).
South Korea also proved to be an interesting case as all banks in our sample had, based on performance evaluation under Basel II, a core equity Tier I ratio in excess of the required 7%, which increased from, on average, 8% in 2008 to over 11.5% in 2010 -with Shinhan Bank, Citibank Korea, and KDB maintaining particularly-high standards by running overall risk-adjusted capital ratios in excess of 16% and Tier 1 capital ratios in excess of 12% (FSS, 2010) . Hence, with high overall and Tier I ratios, one could argue whether the use of equity as a risk control management variable in the case of South Korean banks is actually justified, as it proved not to be a powerful discriminatory variable in the determination of bank efficiency. It did not offer valuable risk management information as all banks were highly-capitalised, even though some did sell hybrid and subordinated securities to the Bank Recapitalisation Fund. However, the 6 banks that did participate only sold a total of KRW2,206 billion to the available fund of KRW20,000 billion (11%) and the majority only on a short term basis to weather the GFC storm.
Conclusions
Having elected for a profit-based approach to the estimation of South Korean bank efficiency, we then proceeded to provide a systematic study of the choice of risk management control variable in a non-parametric DEA analysis that allows for the inclusion of both 'good' and 'bad' inputs and outputs. Using the model of Liu et al. (2010) , we examine the dependency of the estimated technical efficiency scores on the chosen risk control variables, embracing loan loss provisions and equity as good inputs and non-performing as a bad output. We then find that, using the Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) adapted Li (1996) test, if only one of the three risk management control variables is to be included in such an analysis then it should be loan loss provisions. We also find, however, that the inclusion of all three risk management control variables is to be preferred to just including one, but that the inclusion of two such variables did not produce statistically different results as including all three. We therefore conclude that, given the 'curse of dimensionality', the preferred approach is to include (any) two of the three risk management control variables identified, whichever the experts find most relevant for the context at study. The wider implication for research into bank efficiency is that the optimal choice of risk management control variable is likely to be crucial to the delivery of both un-biased estimates of bank efficiency and the specification of the model to be estimated. (6) 
